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Roe, Casey, and Sex-Selection Abortion 
Bans 
Thomas J. Molony* 
Abstract 
Forty years after Roe v. Wade, state legislatures continue to 
try to chip away at a woman’s right to choose. In a flurry of recent 
activity, lawmakers across the country have considered and, in 
some cases, adopted sweeping measures that range from expanded 
clinic-safety regulations to outright bans on abortion early in 
pregnancy if a fetal heartbeat can be detected. Several states have 
banned sex-selection abortions—abortions sought based on the sex 
of the fetus. These narrow bans advance society’s interest in 
eradicating sex discrimination, an interest the Supreme Court has 
not considered in the abortion context but elsewhere has described 
as compelling. Sex-selection abortion bans, therefore, test in a new 
way the limits of state regulation. 
To survive constitutional challenge, a sex-selection abortion 
ban must satisfy the requirements established in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. Casey, while 
retaining Roe’s “central holding” that a woman has the right to 
choose abortion before the fetus is viable, fundamentally changed 
the constitutional landscape by granting states greater latitude to 
regulate abortion pre-viability. Under Casey, states may adopt 
reasonable pre-viability regulations that do not impose an undue 
burden on the woman’s right and may restrict abortion post-
viability so long as exceptions apply when the procedure is 
necessary to protect the life or health of the woman.  
Recent federal court decisions suggest that Casey leaves no 
room for a pre-viability ban of any sort. Under these precedents, 
sex-selection abortion bans, which typically apply throughout 
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pregnancy, would seem destined to fail. A careful reading of Roe 
and Casey, however, reveals a less certain destiny. While 
recognizing the barriers Casey presents for sex-selection abortion 
bans, this Article offers an argument as to how a narrowly drafted 
ban might survive a challenge under Casey. The Article also 
evaluates the bans currently in place or that have been proposed 
and offers suggestions for improvement, including 
recommendations as to how the bans might be modified to fit more 
safely within the parameters the Court has established. 
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I. Introduction 
Forty years have passed since the United States Supreme 
Court decided Roe v. Wade,1 and lawmakers across the country 
continue to adopt legislation to rein in a woman’s right to choose. 
Legislative efforts have accelerated recently,2 with states such as 
Texas, North Dakota, Kansas, and North Carolina adopting new 
abortion laws in the face of strong opposition by pro-choice 
advocates.3 The measures adopted in North Dakota, Kansas, and 
North Carolina include bans on sex-selection abortions—
abortions sought because of the sex of the fetus.4 Because these 
                                                                                                     
 1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 2. See Chris Good, Starting This Week, It’s Harder to Get an Abortion in 5 
States, ABC NEWS (July 2, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/ 
2013/07/starting-this-week-its-harder-to-get-an-abortion-in-5-states/ (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2014) (“Abortion restrictions are popping up everywhere, it seems.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. See Juliet Eilperin, N.C. Gov. McCrory Signs Anti-Abortion Bill into 
Law Monday Night, WASH. POST (July 29, 2013, 10:38 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/07/29/nc-gov-
mccrory-signs-anti-abortion-bill-into-law-monday-night/ (last visited Dec. 29, 
2013) (indicating that North Carolina’s governor signed a 2013 abortion law, “as 
abortion rights protestors waged a 12-hour vigil across the street from his 
executive mansion”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); John 
Eligon & Erik Eckholm, New Laws Ban Most Abortions in North Dakota, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/us/north-dakota-
governor-signs-strict-abortion-limits.htmp?pagewanted=all (last visited Dec. 29, 
2013) (indicating that pro-choice advocates “quickly condemned” a 2013 North 
Dakota abortion law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Manny 
Fernandez, Abortion Restrictions Become Law in Texas, but Opponents Will 
Press Fight, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/ 
us/perry-signs-texas-abortion-restrictions-into-law.html?_r=0 (last visited Dec. 
29, 2013) (noting substantial opposition to a 2013 Texas law banning abortions 
after twenty weeks gestation and modifying standards for abortion clinics) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); John Hanna, Sweeping Anti-
Abortion Bill Passes Kansas Legislature, Awaits Governor’s Signature, KAN. 
CITY STAR (Apr. 6, 2013), http://www.kansascity.com/2013/04/06/4165019 
/sweeping-anti-abortion-bill-passes.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2013) (noting the 
positions taken by abortion foes and abortion rights advocates with respect to a 
2013 Kansas abortion law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 4. See H.B. 2253, 2013 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. § 10(a) (Kan. 2013) (“No 
person shall perform or induce an abortion . . . with knowledge that the 
pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the 
[fetus].”); S.B. 353, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. § 90-21.121(a) (N.C. 2013) 
(“[No] person shall perform or attempt to perform an abortion upon a woman in 
this State with knowledge . . . that a significant factor in the woman seeking the 
abortion is related to the sex of the [fetus].”); H.B. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. 
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narrow bans attempt to control access to abortion based on a 
woman’s reasons for having the procedure, they challenge the 
constitutional limits of abortion regulation in a new way. 
The Court in Roe rejected the notion that a woman has the 
right to choose to have an abortion “at whatever time, in 
whatever way, and for whatever reason that she alone chooses.”5 
In Roe and later in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey,6 the Court addressed limitations on 
timing,7 and in Gonzales v. Carhart,8 the Court dealt with 
constraints on manner.9 The Court, however, never has squarely 
faced the question of a state’s ability to limit abortion based on 
the reasons for which it is sought. Sex-selection abortion bans 
present this very question. 
It is common to think of Roe as the constitutional norm for 
abortion regulations and restrictions, but Casey sets the current 
standard. Therefore, it is Casey that a sex-selection abortion ban 
must satisfy to be constitutional. While the Court in Casey 
retained the “most central principle of Roe” that a woman has the 
“right to terminate her pregnancy before viability,”10 it gave 
                                                                                                     
Sess. § 2(1) (N.D. 2013) (“[A] physician may not intentionally perform or attempt 
to perform an abortion with knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the 
abortion solely on account of the sex of the [fetus] . . . .”). The bans adopted in 
North Dakota, Kansas, and North Carolina, as well as some of those that have 
been adopted or proposed in other states, apply to any “unborn child,” a term 
that would include not only a fetus but also a human in an earlier stage of 
development. See H.B. 2253, 2013 Leg., 2013-14 Sess. §§ 1, 10 (Kan. 2013) 
(defining and using the term “unborn child”); H.B. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. §§ 1, 2 (N.D. 2013) (same); S.B. 353, Gen. Assemb., 2013-14 Reg. Sess. 
§ 3(a) (N.C. 2013) (using the term “unborn child”); H.B. 386, 97th Gen. Assemb., 
1st Reg. Sess. § A (Mo. 2013) (defining and using the term “unborn child”). 
Nevertheless, the term “fetus” is used throughout this Article when describing 
sex-selection abortion bans. 
 5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 6. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 7. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 160, 165 (setting viability as the time at which a 
state may prohibit abortion entirely so long as exceptions are made for 
protection of the life or health of the woman); Casey, 505 U.S. at 871, 879 
(stating that “[t]he woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is 
the most central principle of Roe v. Wade . . . and [is] a component of liberty”). 
 8. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 9. See id. at 132, 156 (holding that a federal ban on partial-birth abortion 
did not violate the Constitution). 
 10. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871. 
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states substantially more latitude to adopt abortion laws than 
they had under Roe. In Casey, the Court preserved the ability of 
states under Roe to “regulate, and even proscribe, abortion [after 
viability] except where it is necessary . . . for the preservation of 
the life or health of the mother”11 and opened a new door to pre-
viability measures that do not pose an “undue burden” on a 
woman’s right to abort a non-viable fetus.12 
Despite the door that Casey opened, the prospects for sex-
selection abortion bans seem rather grim. Though otherwise 
narrow, sex-selection abortion bans typically apply throughout 
pregnancy,13 and recent federal court decisions call into question 
whether Casey permits a pre-viability ban of any kind.14 Unlike 
the bans considered in these recent cases, however, sex-selection 
abortion bans serve a state interest that was not considered in 
Roe or Casey—that of eliminating sex discrimination and its 
harmful effects. The presence of this interest, which the Court 
has described as “compelling” in cases involving freedom of 
association for expressive purposes,15 makes the answer to the 
question of the constitutionality of sex-selection abortion bans 
less clear than it might first appear. 
This Article considers whether a sex-selection abortion ban 
can, and how it might, be upheld under Casey. Part II begins by 
describing the various forms of sex-selection bans that have been 
adopted or considered by various state legislatures and in the 
U.S. Congress. Part III follows with a general discussion of Roe 
and how Casey, through its undue burden standard, altered the 
                                                                                                     
 11. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 
(quoting Roe). 
 12. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876–77 
(1992) (describing the undue burden test). 
 13. See infra note 49 and accompanying text (noting that only the ban 
proposed in Oregon does not apply throughout pregnancy). 
 14. See infra notes 57–99 and accompanying text (discussing recent federal 
cases striking down abortion bans). 
 15. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 
549 (1987) (citing a state’s “compelling interest in eliminating discrimination 
against women” to uphold a state public accommodation law against the 
argument that it unconstitutionally infringed Rotary members’ right of 
expressive association); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) 
(finding the State’s compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against 
women justified an infringement on an organization’s freedom of association). 
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framework Roe had established for evaluating abortion laws. In 
Part IV, the Article examines whether the most narrowly drawn 
sex-selection abortion ban can survive Casey. It explains that 
such a ban is constitutional post-viability even without an explicit 
life or health exception. After acknowledging the difficulty in 
arguing that such a ban is constitutional pre-viability, Part IV 
attempts to lay out a reasonable argument in support of a very 
narrow pre-viability sex-selection abortion ban. To make the 
argument, the Article examines the Court’s treatment of the 
parental consent provisions of the Pennsylvania statute at issue 
in Casey and draws on Court decisions recognizing that a state’s 
compelling interest in eliminating sex-discrimination justifies a 
slight infringement on the constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
expressive association. This same interest, Part IV posits, also 
may be sufficient to sanction the slight infringement that a 
narrow sex-selection abortion ban may impose on a woman’s right 
to choose. Part V considers the future of sex-selection abortion 
bans, how states might make their bans more effective, and what 
states might do to improve their prospects of surviving Casey. 
The Article concludes that sex-selection abortion bans primarily 
serve not as a practical barrier to abortion, but as a vehicle—and 
an important one—for a state to emphasize the equal dignity that 
women and men share, and in light of that reality, states should 
draft their bans carefully so that they can deliver this important 
message as powerfully as possible. 
II. Sex-Selection Abortion Bans 
Although sex-selection abortion bans have received quite a 
bit of attention lately, they are not new. For over twenty years, 
Illinois and Pennsylvania have prohibited abortion when it is 
sought solely based on the sex of the fetus.16 New bans, however, 
have started to appear in greater numbers in the past few years. 
Since 2010, five additional states—Arizona, Kansas, North 
                                                                                                     
 16. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 510/6(8) (1984) (“No person shall 
intentionally perform an abortion with the knowledge that the pregnant woman 
is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the fetus.”); 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 3204(c) (West 1989) (“No abortion which is sought solely because of 
the sex of the [fetus] shall be deemed a necessary abortion.”). 
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Carolina, North Dakota, and Oklahoma—have enacted sex-
selection abortion bans.17 In addition, bills proposing sex-selection 
abortion bans have been introduced recently in eleven other state 
legislatures and in Congress.18 
                                                                                                     
 17. See H.B. 2253, 2013 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. § 10(a) (Kan. 2013) 
(prohibiting a person from “perform[ing] or induc[ing] an abortion . . . with 
knowledge that the pregnant women is seeking the abortion solely on account of 
the sex of the [fetus]”); S.B. 353, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 90-
21.121(a) (N.C. 2013) (providing that no one shall perform an abortion “with 
knowledge, or an objective reason to know, that a significant factor in the 
woman seeking the abortion is related to the sex of the [fetus]”); H.B. 1305, 63d 
Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1(a) (N.D. 2013) (barring any physician from 
“intentionally perform[ing] or attempt[ing] to perform an abortion with 
knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely on account of 
the sex of the [fetus]”); H.B. 2443, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 13-3603.02(A)(1) 
(Ariz. 2011) (proscribing the act of “perform[ing] an abortion knowing that the 
abortion is sought based on the sex or race of the child”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 
§ 1-731.2(B) (West 2010) (“No person shall knowingly or recklessly perform or 
attempt to perform an abortion with knowledge that the pregnant female is 
seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the [fetus].”). 
 18. See Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2013, H.R. 447, 
113th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (2013) (establishing criminal and civil liability for 
“knowingly perform[ing] an abortion knowing that such abortion is sought based 
on the sex, gender, color or race of the [fetus]”); H.B. 1131, 69th Gen. Assemb., 
1st Reg. Sess. § 18-3.5-203(1) (Colo. 2013) (prohibiting a person from knowingly 
performing a sex-selection abortion, using force to coerce a sex-selection 
abortion, soliciting or accepting money to perform such abortion, or transporting 
a woman to obtain such a procedure); S.B. 56, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. 
§ 18-3.5-203(1) (Colo. 2013) (same); H.B. 845, 115th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(6)(a) 
(Fla. 2013) (“A person may not knowingly . . . perform, induce, or actively 
participate in a termination of a pregnancy knowing that it is sought based on 
the sex or race of the [fetus]”); S.B. 1072, 115th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(6)(a) (Fla. 
2013) (same); H.B. 1430, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 3 (Ind. 2013) 
(prohibiting the intentional performance of an abortion before and after viability 
“if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking a sex-selective 
abortion”); S.B. 183, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 4 (Ind. 2013) (same); 
H.B. 386, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 188.281(1) (Mo. 2013) (“No person 
shall intentionally perform . . . an abortion with the knowledge that the 
pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the 
[fetus].”); S.B. 2286, 236th Leg. Sess., 2013–14 Reg. Sess. § 230-e(2) (N.Y. 2013) 
(“No person shall knowingly or recklessly perform or attempt to perform an 
abortion with knowledge that the pregnant female is seeking the abortion solely 
on account of the sex of the [fetus].”); H.B. 3515, 77th Leg. Assemb., 2013 Reg. 
Sess. § 1(2) (Or. 2013) (barring the performance of “late-term sex-selection 
abortion[s],” defined as sex-selection abortions performed during the third 
trimester of the pregnancy); H.B. 17, 83d Leg., 2d Sess. § 170.003(a) (Tex. 2013) 
(prohibiting a person from “knowingly perform[ing] or attempt[ing] to 
perform . . . an abortion that is based on the sex of the pregnant woman’s 
[fetus]” as well as the use or threat of force to intentionally coerce such a 
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By and large, the sex-selection abortion bans that have been 
adopted or proposed are very narrowly drawn. Many only prohibit 
a person from performing an abortion when he or she knows that 
the procedure is being sought solely based on the sex of the 
fetus.19 The scope of others, however, is less clear. The Arizona 
statute, for example, does not state explicitly that it is limited to 
cases in which an abortion is sought solely for the purposes of sex 
selection.20 As a result, the law might be interpreted to apply 
                                                                                                     
procedure); H.B. 1316, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Va. 2013) (“Any 
person who intentionally performs an abortion with knowledge that the abortion 
is sought solely and exclusively on account of the sex of the [fetus] is guilty of a 
class 4 felony.”); Assemb. B. 217, 101st Leg., 2013–14 Reg. Sess. § 253.103 (Wis. 
2013) (“No person may perform an abortion knowing that it is a sex-selective 
abortion.”); Assemb. B. 2157, 215th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. § 2 (N.J. 2012) 
(prohibiting a person from “knowingly perform[ing] a sex-selection or race-
selection abortion”); H.B. 570, 129th Gen. Assemb., 2011–12 Sess. § 2919.20 
(Ohio 2012) (proscribing the purposeful performance of sex-selection abortions, 
including using force or funds to induce such procedures, and providing a civil 
action for pregnant woman upon whom such an abortion is performed). 
 19. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT § 510/6(8) (1985) (prohibiting abortions 
performed “with knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion 
solely on account of the sex of the fetus”); H.B. 2253, 2013 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. 
§ 10(a) (Kan. 2013) (same); H.B. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.D. 
2013) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-731.2(B) (West 2010) (same); H.B. 
1430, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 3 (Ind. 2013) (proscribing abortions 
performed by a person who “knows that the pregnant woman is seeking a sex-
selective abortion”); S.B. 183, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 4 (Ind. 2013) 
(same); H.B. 386, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 188.281(1) (Mo. 2013) 
(prohibiting abortions performed “with the knowledge that the pregnant woman 
is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the [fetus]”); S.B. 2286, 
236th Leg. Sess., 2013–14 Reg. Sess. § 230-e(2) (N.Y. 2013) (same); H.B. 1316, 
2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Va. 2013) (banning abortions “sought solely 
and exclusively on account of” the fetus’s sex); Assemb. B. 217, 101st Leg., 2013–
14 Reg. Sess. § 253.103 (Wis. 2013) (prohibiting a person from performing an 
abortion “knowing that it is a sex-selective abortion”). The Pennsylvania statute 
appears to impose liability even when a person is merely reckless in performing 
a sex-selection abortion. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204(a), (c), (d) (West 1989). 
The proposed Oregon bill seems to provide for liability for performing an 
abortion solely based on the sex of the fetus, even if the person performing the 
sex-selection abortion does so neither knowingly nor recklessly. H.B. 3515, 77th 
Leg. Assemb., 2013 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013). 
 20. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02(A) (2013). The proposed federal 
Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2013 and bills introduced in 
Colorado, Florida, and Ohio similarly omit the word “solely.” Prenatal 
Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2013, H.R. 447, 113th Cong. (2013); H.B. 
13-1131, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013); S.B. 13-056, 69th Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013); H.B. 845, 2013 Leg., Leg. Sess. 2013. (Fla. 
2013); S.B. 1072, 2013 Leg., Leg. Sess. 2013. (Fla. 2013); H.B. 570, 129th Gen. 
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when sex selection is one, but not the only, reason an abortion is 
sought. North Carolina’s sex-selection abortion ban is perhaps 
the broadest of those adopted or proposed. The 2013 law extends 
to any case in which a person performing an abortion has 
“knowledge, or an objective reason to know, that a significant 
factor in the woman seeking the abortion is related to the sex of 
the [fetus].”21 Therefore, it clearly bans abortions when reasons 
other than sex selection are present.  
The scope of some sex-selection abortion bans is narrowed by 
exceptions. The Illinois and Oklahoma bans, for instance, do not 
bar sex-selection abortions that are sought when the fetus has, or 
is suspected to have, a genetic abnormality.22 Virginia’s proposed 
ban excludes abortions necessary to protect the life of the 
woman.23 And the bans enacted in Arizona and Kansas, and those 
                                                                                                     
Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2011-12 (Ohio 2012). Similar to the Pennsylvania statute, 
the bill introduced in Texas seems to allow for liability when the person 
performing the abortion does not know that it is being sought based solely on 
the sex of the fetus. See H.B. 17, 83d Leg., 2d Reg. Session (Tex. 2013) 
(prohibiting only knowingly performing a sex-selection abortion, not knowingly 
performing an abortion that is known to be sought for purposes of sex selection). 
 21. S.B. 353, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 90-21.121 (N.C. 2013) 
(emphasis added). 
 22. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 510/6(8) (1985) (“Nothing in Section 6(8) 
shall be construed to proscribe the performance of an abortion on account of the 
sex of the fetus because of a genetic disorder linked to that sex.”); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 63, § 1-731.2(B) (West 2010) (“Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to proscribe the performance of an abortion because the [fetus] has a 
genetic disorder that is sex-linked.”). The ban proposed in New York likewise 
excludes abortions sought because of a genetic abnormality. See S.B. 2286, 
236th Leg. Sess., 2013–14 Reg. Sess. § 230-e(2) (N.Y. 2013) (“Nothing in this 
section shall be construed to proscribe the performance of an abortion because 
the [fetus] has a genetic disorder that is sex-linked.”). North Dakota, on the 
other hand, specifically prohibits abortions sought based on a genetic 
abnormality. See H.B. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2(1) (N.D. 2013) 
(“[A] physician may not intentionally perform . . . an abortion with knowledge 
that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the [fetus] has 
been diagnosed with . . . a genetic abnormality.”). Proposed bans in Indiana and 
Missouri would do likewise. See S.B. 183, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 6 
(Ind. 2013) (prohibiting an individual from intentionally performing an abortion 
before and after viability “if the person knows that the pregnant woman is 
seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with a genetic 
abnormality”); H.B. 386, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 188.287(1) (Mo. 
2013) (“No person shall intentionally perform . . . an abortion with knowledge 
that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the [fetus] has 
been diagnosed with . . . a genetic abnormality . . . .”). 
 23. See H.B. 1316, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Va. 2013) (“This 
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proposed in Congress and in the Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Texas, and Virginia legislatures, explicitly exempt from liability a 
woman seeking a sex-selection abortion.24 
III. Roe and Casey Generally 
No matter its scope, a sex-selection abortion ban must pass 
through Casey to survive a constitutional challenge, and to 
understand Casey, it is important to begin with Roe. Although the 
Court in Roe found a woman’s right to choose abortion within the 
now long-recognized right to privacy under the Fourteenth 
Amendment,25 the Court cautioned that the abortion right is not 
absolute26 and is “inherently different” from other privacy 
rights.27 According to the Court, a woman’s right to choose must 
                                                                                                     
section shall not prohibit the use by a physician of any procedure that, in 
reasonable medical judgment, is necessary to prevent the death of the 
mother . . . .”). 
 24. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02(E) (1978) (West) (“A woman on 
whom a sex-selection or race-selection abortion is performed is not subject to 
criminal prosecution or civil liability . . . .”); Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act 
(PRENDA) of 2013, H.R. 447, 113th Cong. § 3(a) (2013) (“A woman upon whom a 
sex-selection or race-selection abortion is performed may not be prosecuted or 
held civilly liable . . . .”); H.B. 2253, 2013 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. § 10(c) (Kan. 2013) 
(“A woman upon whom an abortion is performed shall not be prosecuted . . . .”); 
H.B. 386, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 188.296(2) (Mo. 2013) 
(establishing that any woman upon whom a prohibited abortion is performed 
shall not be prosecuted or held civilly or criminally liable); H.B. 17, 83d Leg., 2d 
Sess. § 170.003(e) (Tex. 2013) (exempting a woman on whom a prohibited 
abortion is performed from criminal liability); H.B. 1316, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. § 1 (Va. 2013) (“The mother may not be prosecuted for any criminal 
offense based on the performance of any [prohibited] act . . . .”); Assemb. B. 
2157, 215th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. § 4 (N.J. 2012) (same); H.B. 570, 129th Gen. 
Assemb., 2011–12 Sess. § 2919.20(D) (Ohio 2012) (same). The bans proposed in 
Florida only would exempt minor women from liability. See H.B. 845, 115th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(6)(e) (Fla. 2013) (“A mother of a [fetus] on whom a sex-
selection or race-selection termination of pregnancy is performed who as not 
attained 18 years of age . . . is not subject to criminal prosecution or civil 
liability . . . .”); S.B. 1072, 115th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(6)(e) (Fla. 2013) (same). 
 25. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973) (finding that the right to 
privacy includes the right to have an abortion). 
 26. See id. (explaining that the right to choose abortion is not free from all 
government interference). 
 27. See id. at 159 (stating that the existence of potential human life 
differentiates this privacy right from those such as marital intimacy, 
procreation, or education of one’s children). 
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be balanced against three important state interests: 
“safeguarding health, . . . maintaining medical standards, and . . . 
protecting potential life.”28 “At some point in pregnancy,” the 
Court explained, “these respective interests become sufficiently 
compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the 
abortion decision.”29 
The Court’s assessment of the state’s interests in protecting 
women’s health and in guarding potential life resulted in Roe’s 
famous trimester framework.30 Under this framework, until the 
end of the first trimester, neither interest is compelling31 and 
therefore “the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left 
to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending 
physician.”32 At about the end of the first trimester, however, the 
state’s interest in the pregnant woman’s health becomes 
compelling, allowing the state to “regulate the abortion procedure 
in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.”33 It is 
not until the fetus attains viability—when it is “potentially able 
to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid”34—
that the state’s interest in protecting potential life becomes 
compelling and justifies measures that “regulate, [or] even 
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the 
mother.”35 
The Roe Court’s trimester framework proved unkind to many 
abortion regulations. Under this framework, the Court struck 
down the Texas statute at issue in Roe, which had outlawed 
abortion except when necessary to save the life of the woman.36 
                                                                                                     
 28. Id. at 154. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. at 162–63 (describing a balance of the state’s interests against 
those of the woman). 
 31. See id. at 163 (establishing that neither interest becomes compelling 
until “approximately the end of the first trimester”). 
 32. Id. at 164. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. at 160. 
 35. Id. at 165. 
 36. See id. at 164 (concluding that Texas’s failure to distinguish between 
different stages in the pregnancy and its limiting the procedure only to 
circumstances in which a woman’s life is at risk rendered its statute 
unconstitutional). 
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The Court dealt likewise with other lesser abortion regulations 
that later came before it,37 finding these regulations incapable of 
satisfying the Court’s most exacting standard of review—strict 
scrutiny—under which a measure may “be sustained only if 
drawn in narrow terms to further a compelling state interest.”38 
In Casey, the Court determined that the cases subsequent to 
Roe went too far and failed to recognize the weight of the state’s 
interests.39 Presented with the opportunity to overrule Roe, 
however, it declined and instead retained Roe’s “essential 
holding,” which the Court described as consisting of three parts: 
First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to 
have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without 
undue interference from the State. Before viability, the State’s 
interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of 
abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the 
woman’s effective right to elect the procedure. Second is a 
confirmation of the State’s power to restrict abortions after 
fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies 
which endanger the woman’s life or health. And third is the 
principle that the State has legitimate interests from the 
outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman 
and the life of the fetus that may become a child.40 
The Court in Casey determined that the third principle had been 
neglected in later cases that applied Roe’s trimester framework.41 
Consequently, it abandoned this “elaborate, but rigid construct”42 
in favor of an “undue burden” standard, which the Court asserted 
                                                                                                     
 37. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 
U.S. 747, 759, 771 (1986) (endorsing “the general principles laid down in Roe” 
and finding unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute that required a woman to 
be provided with certain information before having an abortion); City of Akron 
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 428–30, 452 (1983) 
(applying Roe’s trimester framework to strike down an ordinance requiring 
informed consent, a waiting period, and parental consent). 
 38. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992). 
 39. See id. at 872 (noting that the Court’s later application of the trimester 
framework “sometimes contradicted the State’s permissible exercise of its 
powers”). 
 40. Id. at 846. 
 41. See id. at 871 (“Roe v. Wade speaks with clarity in establishing not only 
the woman’s liberty but also the State’s ‘important and legitimate interest in 
potential life.’ That portion of the decision . . . has been given too little 
acknowledgment and implementation . . . .”). 
 42. Id. at 872. 
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was “the appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest [in 
potential life] with the woman’s constitutionally protected 
liberty.”43  
The Court in Casey “reaffirm[ed] Roe’s holding” that, after 
viability, a state has the power to prohibit abortion so long as 
exceptions are made for circumstances in which the life or health 
of the woman are at stake.44 It was as to pre-viability measures 
that Casey made a change, opting for its undue burden standard 
over Roe’s trimester framework.45 Under this new standard, the 
Court explained, “[a]n undue burden exists, and therefore a 
provision of a law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
before the fetus attains viability.”46 Absent such purpose or effect, 
a regulation designed to encourage a woman to give birth or to 
protect the woman’s health will be sustained so long as it has a 
rational basis.47 The Pennsylvania statute at issue in Casey—
which included an informed consent provision, a twenty-four-
hour waiting period, and a parental consent requirement—
largely passed the test.48 
                                                                                                     
 43. Id. at 876. 
 44. See id. at 879 (stating that the adoption of the undue burden test does 
not disturb Roe’s holding that a state may restrict a woman’s right to choose 
abortion after viability). 
 45. See id. at 872 (explaining that under Roe’s trimester framework “almost 
no regulation at all is permitted during the first trimester of pregnancy,” which 
“sometimes contradict[s] the State’s permissible exercise of its power”).  
 46. Id. at 878. 
 47. See id. (“[A] state measure designed to persuade her to choose 
childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal. 
Regulations designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion are 
valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.”). 
 48. See id. at 887, 895, 899 (finding that the twenty-four-hour waiting 
period, informed consent, and parental consent requirements do not 
unconstitutionally impose an undue burden, but concluding that the spousal 
notification provision unconstitutionally burdens a woman’s right to choose 
abortion).  
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IV. Surviving Casey 
All of the sex-selection abortion bans that have been enacted 
or proposed, with the exception of the one in Oregon,49 are 
effective throughout pregnancy. Therefore, most of the bans must 
satisfy both the pre-viability and post-viability standards 
outlined in Casey.50  
What Casey states generally about a woman’s right to choose 
abortion and the way the opinion explains the undue burden 
standard raise significant doubts as to whether any pre-viability 
sex-selection abortion ban is permissible. It seems appropriate, 
then, to begin considering this question by examining the 
constitutionality of a sex-selection abortion ban in its narrowest 
form—one that, like those adopted in Kansas, Illinois, North 
Dakota, and Oklahoma, prohibits a person from performing an 
abortion knowing that it is being sought solely based on the sex of 
                                                                                                     
 49. Compare H.B. 3515, 77th Leg. Assemb., 2013 Reg. Sess. § 1 (Or. 2013) 
(prohibiting only “late-term sex-selection abortion,” defined as “an abortion 
performed during the third trimester of pregnancy”), with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
63 § 1-731.2(B) (West 2010) (applying the ban throughout pregnancy); Prenatal 
Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2013, H.R. 447, 113th Cong. § 3(a)(1) 
(2013) (same); H.B. 2253, 2013 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. § 10(a) (Kan. 2013) (same); 
S.B. 353, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 90-21.121(a) (N.C. 2013) (same); 
H.B. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1(a) (N.D. 2013) (same); H.B. 1131, 
69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 18-3.5-203(1) (Colo. 2013) (same); S.B. 56, 
69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 18-3.5-203(1) (Colo. 2013) (same); H.B. 845, 
115th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(6)(a) (Fla. 2013) (same); S.B. 1072, 115th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. § 3(6)(a) (Fla. 2013) (same); H.B. 1430, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. 
§ 3 (Ind. 2013) (specifying that the prohibition on sex-selection abortions applies 
to those performed both pre-viability and post-viability); S.B. 183, 118th Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 4 (Ind. 2013) (same); H.B. 386, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st 
Reg. Sess. § 188.281(1) (Mo. 2013) (prohibiting sex-selection abortions performed 
at any point in the pregnancy); S.B. 2286, 236th Leg. Sess., 2013–14 Reg. Sess. 
§ 230-e(2) (N.Y. 2013) (same); H.B. 570, 129th Gen. Assemb., 2011–12 Sess. 
§ 2919.20 (Ohio 2012) (same); H.B. 17, 83d Leg., 2d Sess. § 170.003(a) (Tex. 
2013) (same); H.B. 1316, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Va. 2013) (same); 
Assemb. B. 217, 101st Leg., 2013–14 Reg. Sess. § 253.103 (Wis. 2013) (same); 
Assemb. B. 2157, 215th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. § 2 (N.J. 2012) (same); and H.B. 
2443, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 13-3603.02(A)(1) (Ariz. 2011) (banning the 
performance of sex-selection abortions without regard to the point in the 
pregnancy).  
 50. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156 (2007) (“The abortions 
affected by the Act’s regulations take place both previability and postviability; 
so . . . the undue burden analysis . . . [is] applicable.”). 
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the fetus. 51 This Part evaluates such a narrow ban and offers an 
argument in support of its constitutionality. Part V discusses how 
broader bans might fare. 
A. An Easy Case Post-Viability 
Casey’s treatment of post-viability abortion regulations is 
consistent with Roe and relatively clear: “[S]ubsequent to 
viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of 
human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, 
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical 
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the 
mother.”52 A post-viability sex-selection abortion ban that 
contains explicit health and life exceptions, therefore, easily 
satisfies Casey. None of the enacted or proposed sex-selection 
abortion bans, however, specify a health exception, and only the 
ban proposed in Virginia expressly excludes abortions that are 
necessary to protect a woman’s life.53 Nevertheless, based on the 
Court’s decision in Gonzales, a narrow sex-selection abortion ban 
without specific life or health exceptions is constitutional.54 
In Gonzales, the Court upheld the 2003 federal partial-birth 
abortion ban notwithstanding the fact that the law did not 
                                                                                                     
 51. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 510/6(8) (1985) (proscribing sex-selection 
abortions intentionally performed by any person “with knowledge that the 
pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the 
fetus”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-731.2(B) (West 2010) (prohibiting any person 
from “knowingly or recklessly perform[ing] . . . an abortion with knowledge that 
the pregnant female is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the 
[fetus]”); H.B. 2253, 2013 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. § 10(a) (Kan. 2013) (barring any 
“person” from performing or inducing an abortion “with knowledge that the 
pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the 
[fetus]”); H.B. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1(a) (N.D. 2013) (prohibiting 
a physician from “intentionally performing . . . an abortion with knowledge that 
the pregnant woman is seeking an abortion solely” because of the fetus’s sex).  
 52. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) 
(quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973)). 
 53. See H.B. 1316, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Va. 2013) (“This 
section shall not prohibit the use by a physician of any procedure that, in 
reasonable medical judgment, is necessary to prevent the death of the 
mother . . . .”). 
 54. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 166–67 (upholding a federal prohibition on 
partial-birth abortion despite the absence of a health exception). 
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include a health exception, and the Court did so even though 
there was significant disagreement as to whether the use of the 
partial-birth abortion procedure might be medically necessary in 
some circumstances.55 A narrow sex-selection abortion ban 
presents a stronger case than the ban on partial-birth abortion at 
issue in Gonzales because no serious argument can be made that 
an abortion sought solely based on the sex of the fetus ever is 
medically necessary. If a woman seeks an abortion when her life 
or health is at stake, she is not seeking the procedure solely based 
on the sex of the fetus, and the procedure would not be barred 
even if the sex of the fetus were a consideration. For example, a 
narrow ban would not prohibit abortion of a female fetus if 
having a girl somehow would be detrimental to a woman’s 
physical, mental, or emotional health. In such a case, the woman 
would be seeking the abortion not solely based on the sex of the 
fetus, but because of the sex of the fetus and the associated effect 
on her health. Thus, a sex-selection abortion ban in its narrowest 
form should satisfy Casey’s post-viability requirements even 
without explicit life and health exceptions. 
B. An Uphill Climb Pre-Viability 
“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt,”56 the 
Court began in Casey. Yet, in contrast to the standard for post-
viability restrictions, the Court’s explanation of the conditions 
under which pre-viability measures are permitted has left much 
in doubt. The extent of the uncertainty becomes particularly 
evident when one tries to assess the constitutionality of a sex-
selection abortion ban that applies prior to viability. 
Casey is unclear as to whether or how its undue burden 
standard applies to a pre-viability abortion ban. One view, which 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
articulated in Isaacson v. Horne,57 is that Casey categorically bars 
any type of pre-viability ban without regard to the undue burden 
                                                                                                     
 55. See id. at 162–65 (reasoning that the Court has previously “given state 
and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there 
is medical and scientific uncertainty”).  
 56. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. 
 57. 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013). 
ROE, CASEY, AND SEX-SELECTION ABORTION BANS 1105 
standard.58 Another is that Casey’s undue burden test applies, 
but the only consideration under the test is the effect of a ban on 
a woman’s ability to make the “ultimate decision.”59 If either of 
these two interpretations is correct, any sex-selection abortion 
ban—no matter how narrow—is bound to fail. 
Casey, however, leaves open the possibility of a third 
interpretation. The Court’s treatment of the parental consent 
provisions at issue in the case suggests that the undue burden 
test applies to a pre-viability ban and that relevant to the test are 
government interests that are different from those considered in 
Roe and Casey.60 If that is so, there is hope for a narrow sex-
selection abortion ban, which advances a state’s interest in 
eliminating sex discrimination, an interest the Court has 
recognized as compelling in its jurisprudence regarding the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of association for expressive 
purposes. 
1. Pre-Viability Bans Unconstitutional Per Se? 
Before delving into the third possible interpretation of Casey, 
due attention must be given to the first two, for there certainly is 
ample support for them. The Ninth Circuit employed the first 
interpretation in Isaacson; United States District Courts in 
Idaho, Arkansas, and North Dakota applied the second in other 
cases. 
In Isaacson, the Ninth Circuit struck down an Arizona law—
commonly referred to as a “fetal pain statute”—that prohibited 
abortion beginning at twenty weeks’ gestation,61 the time at 
                                                                                                     
 58. See id. at 1225 (striking down an Arizona ban on abortion after twenty 
weeks because it “prohibits pre-viability abortions”). 
 59. See McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1144, 1150–51 (D. 
Idaho 2013) (applying the undue burden test to find that a fetal pain statute 
unconstitutionally placed an “insurmountable obstacle” in the path of a woman 
seeking to abort a nonviable fetus (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992))). 
 60. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) 
(reaffirming that “a State may require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the 
consent of a parent or guardian, provided that there is an adequate judicial 
bypass procedure”). 
 61. See Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F. 3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that 
the challenged provision “extends the abortion ban earlier in pregnancy, to the 
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which the State contended a fetus can begin to feel pain,62 though 
before viability.63 In declaring Arizona’s fetal pain statute 
unconstitutional, the court claimed that the Supreme Court’s 
precedent is clear:  
[A] woman has a constitutional right to choose to terminate 
her pregnancy before the fetus is viable. A prohibition on the 
exercise of that right is per se unconstitutional. While the state 
may regulate the mode and manner of abortion prior to fetal 
viability, it may not proscribe a woman from electing abortion, 
nor may it impose an undue burden on her choice through 
regulation.64 
According to the Ninth Circuit, there was no need to evaluate 
whether the statute imposed an undue burden, and the lower 
court was wrong to do so: “[T]his ‘undue burden’/‘substantial 
obstacle’ mode of analysis has no place where, as here, the state 
is forbidding certain women from choosing pre-viability abortions 
rather than specifying the conditions under which such abortions 
are to be allowed.”65  
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Casey undoubtedly is a 
reasonable one. The Court in Casey stated that, “[r]egardless of 
whether exceptions are made for particular circumstances, a 
State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate 
decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability.”66 Moreover, 
in preserving this “essential holding” of Roe, the Court indicated 
that, “[b]efore viability, the State’s interests are not strong 
enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a 
substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the 
                                                                                                     
period between twenty weeks gestation and fetal viability”). The prohibition 
included an exception for medical emergencies. Id. 
 62. See id. at 1218 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2151(6) (2012) to explain 
that the prohibition is “based on . . . strong medical evidence that unborn 
children feel pain during an abortion at that gestational age”). 
 63. See id. at 1225 (stating that because the parties agree “that no fetus is 
viable at twenty weeks gestational age,” as supported by the district court 
findings, the challenged statute “necessarily prohibits pre-viability abortions”). 
 64. Id. at 1217. 
 65. Id. at 1225. 
 66. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992). The 
Ninth Circuit pointed out that the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 
U.S. 124 (2007), did not disturb this principal. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1223–24. 
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procedure.”67 By speaking separately of a prohibition and the 
imposition of a substantial obstacle, the Court seemed to indicate 
that a pre-viability ban is an absolute obstacle and therefore 
unconstitutional per se. In addition, that Casey, like Roe, permits 
a state to prohibit abortion after viability suggests that a state 
may not do so before viability.68  
Not all courts considering pre-viability bans have taken the 
same approach as the Ninth Circuit. Other courts considering 
pre-viability bans have applied the undue burden test, but they 
have done so in a way that suggests a similar per se bar. In 
McCormack v. Hiedeman,69 the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Idaho decided that Idaho’s fetal pain statute 
“unconstitutionally burden[ed] the abortion right.”70 According to 
the Idaho district court, Casey permits only two types of 
regulation: (1) regulations designed to inform a woman’s choice 
and (2) those aimed at protecting a woman’s health.71 Because 
Idaho’s fetal pain statute did neither, it was unconstitutional.72 
According to the court, the statute was not intended to inform a 
woman’s choice, but instead “to narrow the universe of previously 
allowable pre-viability abortions,”73 and the state had not even 
attempted to justify the law as an effort to protect a woman’s 
health or safety.74 Its purpose and effect, the court asserted, was 
not just to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
                                                                                                     
 67. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
 68.  See id. at 879 (“We also reaffirm Roe’s holding that ‘subsequent to 
viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life 
may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion . . . .”). 
 69. 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Idaho 2013). 
 70. Id. at 1149–50. 
 71. See id. (noting that prior to viability “the State may not rely on its 
interest in the potential life of the fetus to place a substantial obstacle to 
abortion . . . in women’s paths”). 
 72. See id. at 1150 (explaining further that the statute neither seeks to 
persuade a woman to choose childbirth over abortion nor mentions the mother’s 
health or safety as a purpose).  
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. (finding that the stated purpose of the statute “is to protect a 
fetus ‘from the state at which substantial medical evidence indicates that they 
are capable of feeling pain’”).  
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who wants to abort a nonviable fetus, but an “insurmountable” or 
“absolute” one.75 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Arkansas in Edwards v. Beck76 and the United States District 
Court for the District of North Dakota in MKB Management 
Corp. v. Burdick77 likewise applied Casey’s undue burden test to 
Arkansas and North Dakota “fetal heartbeat statutes,” which 
prohibit abortions at or after twelve or six weeks’ gestation when 
a fetal heartbeat is detected.78 Unlike the court in Heideman, 
however, neither the Arkansas district court nor the North 
Dakota district court engaged the undue burden test in a 
meaningful way, doing little more than indicating that the test 
applies, describing what it requires, and concluding that the fetal 
heartbeat statutes imposed an unconstitutional burden on a 
woman’s right to choose.79 
It is just as easy to find support in Casey for the 
interpretation utilized in Heideman, Beck, and MKB Management 
as it is for the view the Ninth Circuit expressed in Isaacson. The 
Court in Casey indicates that “[a] finding of an undue burden is a 
shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the 
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus” and that “[a] 
statute with this purpose [or effect] is invalid.”80 The test, then, 
appears to focus only on the interests of the woman. If a law 
                                                                                                     
 75. Id. at 1151. 
 76. 946 F. Supp. 2d 843 (E.D. Ark. 2013). 
 77. No. 1:13-cv-071, 2013 WL 3779740 (D.N.D. July 22, 2013) (granting the 
plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction). 
 78. See Edwards, 946 F. Supp. at 845, 848 (considering the Arkansas fetal 
heartbeat statute and noting that “[t]he Eighth Circuit has adopted the ‘undue-
burden test’ for facial challenges to abortion laws”); Burdick, 2013 WL 3779740, 
at *9 (considering the North Dakota heartbeat statute and finding that it 
imposes an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose). 
 79. See Edwards, 946 F. Supp. 2d at 850 (noting that the Eighth Circuit 
applies the undue burden test in evaluating abortion laws and concluding that 
the Arkansas fetal heartbeat statute “impermissibly infringes a woman’s 
Fourteenth Amendment right to cho[o]se” to have an abortion before viability); 
Burdick, 2013 WL 3779740, at *1, *10 (“The plaintiffs have clearly shown that 
H.B. 1456 more than likely prohibits pre-viability abortions in a large 
percentage of cases in North Dakota, thereby imposing an undue burden on 
women seeking to obtain an abortion.”).  
 80. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
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hinders her ability to have an abortion, it is unconstitutional, and 
a ban does not just hinder her ability, it eliminates it. 
2. Avoiding a Rush to Judgment: An Alternative Interpretation 
Of course, the decisions in Heideman, Beck, MKB 
Management, and Isaacson do not necessarily foretell the 
unconstitutionality of sex-selection abortion bans because sex-
selection abortion bans are different from fetal pain and 
heartbeat statutes in at least three significant ways. First, sex-
selection abortion bans are narrow and do not seek to replace 
viability as the time at which the state begins to have a broad 
right to restrict abortion.81 Second, while states largely rely on 
their interests in potential life and maternal health to justify 
fetal pain and heartbeat statutes,82 sex-selection abortion bans 
introduce other interests, including that of eradicating sex 
discrimination from society. Third, fetal pain and heartbeat 
statutes focus on the fetus—when it can feel pain or has a 
heartbeat; sex-selection abortion bans focus on the woman—the 
reasons for her decision and the possible impact of her decision on 
society at large. 
                                                                                                     
 81. See Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1229 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Section 7 
effectively shifts from viability to twenty weeks gestation the point at which the 
state’s asserted interests override a woman’s right to choose . . . .”); McCormack 
v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1150 (D. Idaho 2013) (“In essence, the 
PUCPA embodies a legislative judgment equating viability with twenty weeks’ 
gestational age, which the Supreme Court expressly forbids.”); Edwards, 946 F. 
Supp. 2d at 850 (“Act 301 equates fetal viability with a 12-week gestational age 
and a fetal heartbeat . . . .”); Burdick, 2013 WL 3779740, at *9 (“[T]he new law 
seems to suggest that a fetus is viable at the point a heartbeat is detected.”). 
 82. See Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1219 (noting that the district court had 
determined that the State’s interest in potential life and maternal health 
justified Arizona’s fetal pain statute); McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1149–50 
(noting that the Idaho fetal heartbeat law could not be justified by the State’s 
interest in potential life or women’s health); Edwards v. Beck, 946 F. Supp. 2d 
843, 847 (E.D. Ark. 2013) (observing a woman’s right to choose abortion is 
balanced against state interests in potential life and maternal health and that 
Casey concludes that the state’s interests are not sufficient to justify prohibition 
prior to viability). North Dakota, in support of its fetal heartbeat statute, relied 
on “preserving the integrity of the medical profession [and] preventing the 
coarsening of society’s moral sense” as additional justifications. Burdick, 2013 
WL 3779740, at *4. 
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a. Casey May Only Bar Blanket or Comprehensive Abortion Bans 
The courts striking down the fetal pain and heartbeat 
statutes emphasize a problem with the breadth of those 
statutes.83 According to the Ninth Circuit in Isaacson, when 
adopting its fetal pain statute, Arizona had “fail[ed] to follow the 
Supreme Court’s clear rule that no woman may be entirely 
precluded from choosing to terminate her pregnancy at any time 
prior to viability.”84 Perhaps, then, Casey only bars blanket or 
comprehensive bans—those outlawing abortion with or without 
exceptions—that apply for some period of time prior to viability. 
There is evidence in Casey to support this conclusion. 
The Court in Casey indicated that it was reaffirming Roe’s 
essential holding, but it described that holding in various ways 
throughout the opinion. Some of the Court’s statements suggest 
that any pre-viability ban is unconstitutional;85 others indicate 
that only blanket bans are.86 If the Court’s claim that it was 
reaffirming what was essential in Roe is to be taken seriously, it 
would seem appropriate to give more weight to the statements 
that are more faithful to Roe itself and to consider the less 
faithful ones merely as attempts to paraphrase. By interpreting 
the opinion in this way, one reasonably can argue that Casey only 
prohibits blanket bans.  
As to pre-viability measures, Casey is most faithful to Roe in 
two places. At the outset of its opinion, the Court notes the 
                                                                                                     
 83. See Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1227 (noting that Arizona’s twenty-week law 
deprives women of the right to choose abortion at all after twenty weeks 
gestation); McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1151 (indicating that Idaho’s fetal 
pain statute represented “an outright ban on abortions at or after twenty weeks’ 
gestation”); Edwards, 946 F. Supp. 2d at 849 (observing that the Arkansas law 
“prohibits all abortions, . . . where the pregnancy has progressed to twelve 
weeks and a fetal heartbeat is detected”); MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, No. 
1:13-cv-071, 2013 WL 3779740 at *2 (D.N.D. July 22, 2013), (indicating that the 
North Dakota fetal heartbeat statute “would essentially ban abortions in the 
State of North Dakota”). 
 84. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1228 (emphasis added).  
 85. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) 
(indicating that a state may not prevent “any woman from making the ultimate 
decision to terminate her pregnancy prior to viability”). 
 86. See infra text accompanying notes 87–88 and 90 (identifying 
statements that support the conclusion that Casey bars only blanket or 
comprehensive bans). 
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importance of describing Roe’s essential holding “with clarity” 
and, attempting to do that, states: “Before viability, the State’s 
interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of 
abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the 
woman’s effective right to elect the procedure.”87 Later, consistent 
with the first statement, the Court asserts that Roe had 
determined that the “weight [of the State’s interest in protecting 
potential life] is insufficient to justify a ban on abortions prior to 
viability even when it is subject to certain exceptions” and that 
“the essential holding of Roe should be reaffirmed.”88 These 
statements reflect the particular decision the Court had to make 
in Roe—the constitutionality of a Texas statute that outlawed 
abortion except when necessary to save the life of the woman.89 
When considered in light of that statute, the statements in Casey 
suggest that the Constitution bars only a comprehensive ban 
prior to viability, not a narrow ban when justified by a state 
interest that neither Roe nor Casey considered. 
The statement in Casey that is most consistent with Roe 
regarding what a state may do post-viability also supports this 
conclusion. In summarizing the implications of its adoption of the 
undue burden standard, the Court quotes Roe: “We . . . reaffirm 
Roe’s holding that ‘subsequent to viability, the State in promoting 
its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, 
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is 
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation 
of the life or health of the mother.’”90 Again, the Court hearkens 
back to the statute at issue in Roe, which unconstitutionally 
attempted to do pre-viability what is permissible only post-
viability. By looking to the statute at issue in Roe, then, one can 
see an appealing symmetry: pre-viability, a state may not adopt a 
blanket ban even with exceptions; post-viability, it may, so long 
as there are exceptions that permit abortion when the life or 
health of the woman is at risk. Narrow pre-viability bans, 
therefore, are not necessarily prohibited. 
                                                                                                     
 87. Id. at 846. 
 88. Id. at 871. 
 89. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117–18 (1973) (describing the Texas 
statute at issue in the case).  
 90. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65) (emphasis 
added). 
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Still, it is hard to reconcile this interpretation with Roe’s 
holding that, “[f]or the stage prior to approximately the end of the 
first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be 
left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending 
physician”91 and with Casey’s assertion that “a State may not 
prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to 
terminate her pregnancy before viability.”92 The Court’s 
treatment of the parental consent requirement at issue in Casey, 
however, indicates that these statements cannot be taken too far. 
The subject of Casey was the Pennsylvania Abortion Control 
Act of 1982, which among other things provided that an 
unemancipated woman under the age of eighteen could not, 
without the consent of one of her parents, a guardian or a person 
“standing in loco parentis,” choose to have an abortion, except in 
the case of a medical emergency.93 As a safety mechanism, the 
statute included a judicial bypass provision that allowed a court 
to override the parental consent requirement if the court were to 
determine that the woman is “mature and capable of giving 
informed consent” or that an abortion is in the best interests of 
the woman.94 Casey characterized Pennsylvania’s parental 
consent requirement as a “structural mechanism by which . . . the 
parent or guardian of a minor[] may express profound respect for 
the life of the unborn,”95 but in substance the requirement—at 
least theoretically—“banned” pre-viability abortions in a narrow 
set of circumstances. The Pennsylvania statute did not leave all 
women with the right to make the “ultimate decision.”96 To the 
contrary, the law took the decision entirely out of a woman’s 
hands when (i) she is a minor, (ii) one of her parents does not 
consent, (iii) she is not mature and capable of making the decision 
for herself, and (iv) an abortion is not in her best interests. 
                                                                                                     
 91. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. 
 92. Casey, 505 at 879 (emphasis added). 
 93. See id. at 899, 904–05 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206(b) (1990)). 
 94. See id. at 899, 905 (allowing the court to authorize an abortion if it 
would be within the minor woman’s best interests, without specifying how the 
court should determine the woman’s best interests).  
 95. Id. at 877. 
 96. Id. at 879 (applying Roe’s “central holding” that “a State may not 
prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision” to the Pennsylvania 
statute).  
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Nevertheless, the Court—as it had done previously when 
applying Roe to similar parental consent requirements97—
determined that such a ban is constitutional.98 Thus, when the 
Court in Casey stated that “a State may not prohibit any woman 
from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy 
before viability,”99 it could not have meant, literally, any woman.  
To claim that the Court, when referring to the rights of “any 
woman,” meant any adult woman would contradict what the 
Court pointed out in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth:100 “Constitutional rights do not mature and come into 
being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of 
majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the 
Constitution and possess constitutional rights. . . .”101 The 
question, then, is why certain women may be prohibited from 
making “the ultimate decision.” The answer is the presence of an 
interest that is different from the three specifically identified in 
Roe and Casey, an interest related to the woman and not the 
fetus. 
b. Casey May Permit Narrow Bans When Supported by Other 
Interests 
Casey’s treatment of Pennsylvania’s parental-consent 
requirement not only confirms that a state may adopt a limited 
ban, it also indicates that a state may do so if it has an interest of 
sufficient strength that is different from those considered in Roe 
and Casey. In reaching the conclusion that viability creates the 
appropriate balance for the rights of the woman and the rights of 
the state, Roe and Casey considered only two state interests—
                                                                                                     
 97. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 519–20 (1990) 
(upholding a parental consent requirement with judicial bypass provision); 
Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kan. City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490–
94 (1983) (same). 
 98. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) 
(“Our cases establish, and we reaffirm today, that a State may require a minor 
seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian, provided that 
there is an adequate judicial bypass procedure.”). 
 99. Id. at 879. 
 100. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
 101. Id. at 74–75. 
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safeguarding women’s health and protecting potential life.102 
Although it does not say so explicitly, the Court in Casey must 
have allowed the limited “ban” under the Pennsylvania parental 
consent requirement because of another state interest—that of 
protecting minors.103 Therefore, when Casey states that, “before 
viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a 
prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle 
to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure,”104 the 
interests the Court was referring to were those it had weighed in 
settling on viability as the dividing line for abortion regulation.105 
Indeed, when Casey describes Roe’s holding with respect to when 
a legislative ban is justified, it focuses on the state’s interest in 
potential life: “[V]iability marks the earliest point at which the 
State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a 
legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.”106  
Yet, language in Casey does suggest that, even when other 
interests are present, a law is invalid if it places a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion: “[A] statute 
which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some 
other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be considered a 
permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.”107 Again, the 
Court’s treatment of the Pennsylvania parental consent 
requirement indicates that the Court should not be taken literally 
and that state interests other than those considered in Roe and 
Casey are relevant to the undue burden test. The Court in Casey 
applied the undue burden standard to the parental consent 
                                                                                                     
 102. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text (identifying the interests 
considered in Roe and Casey). 
 103. See Planned Parenthood of Idaho v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 922 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (“With regard to minors, . . . the state has additional interests that 
may justify regulation of the manner in which they determine to undergo the 
procedure.” (citing Danforth, 482 U.S. at 74)). 
 104. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
 105. See Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1222 (2013) (listing the interests 
the Court considered in Roe and stating, “those interests could not justify any 
regulation of abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy” (emphasis added) 
(citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973))). 
 106. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860 (emphasis added). 
 107. Id. at 877. 
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provisions108 and determined that they did not impose an undue 
burden, notwithstanding the fact that they took the decision 
entirely out of certain women’s hands and placed it in those of 
either her parent or the court.109 In reaching that conclusion, 
then, the Court must have considered an interest other than 
those of safeguarding a woman’s health, protecting potential life, 
and regulating the medical profession. 
The Court in Casey actually paid very little attention to the 
parental consent provisions, stating instead that “[w]e have been 
over most of this ground before.”110 Notably, when it did so before, 
the Court considered other interests. For example, in City of 
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,111 the Court 
observed that a “majority of the Court [in Bellotti v. Baird112 had] 
indicated that a State’s interest in protecting immature minors 
will sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either 
parental or judicial.”113 Moreover, the Court in Akron identified 
the two interests in Roe that had justified abortion regulations—
                                                                                                     
 108. Id. at 877–78 (referring to the Pennsylvania parental consent 
provisions in discussing “guiding principles” for the undue burden test). 
 109. Interestingly, the Court does not even mention its undue burden test 
when it evaluates the parental consent provision. Instead it cites prior cases and 
merely concludes that the Pennsylvania statute is constitutional. Id. at 899. 
Some of the opinions in prior cases that Casey cites (one of which is a 
concurrence by Justice O’Connor), however, employed an undue burden 
standard in reviewing parental consent provisions. See Ohio v. Akron Center for 
Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 519–20 (1990) (“The Ohio statute, in sum does not 
impose an undue, or otherwise unconstitutional, burden on a minor seeking an 
abortion. We believe, in addition, that the legislature acted in a rational manner 
in enacting H.B. 319.”); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 461 (1990) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“It has been my understanding in this area that ‘[i]f 
the particular regulation does not ‘unduly burde[n]’ the fundamental right, . . . 
then our evaluation of that regulation is limited to our determination that the 
regulation rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose.” (citing Akron v. 
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983))); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 
U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (finding that a Massachusetts parental consent statute 
“impose[d] an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the right to seek an 
abortion”). Moreover, in Casey’s discussion of “guiding principles” for its undue 
burden test, the Court cites its consideration of the Pennsylvania parental 
consent statute as an example of a regulation that does not constitute an undue 
burden. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
 110. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992). 
 111. 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
 112. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
 113. Akron, 462 U.S. at 439. 
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protection of potential life and protection of a woman’s health—
but noted that “the Court repeatedly has recognized that, in view 
of the unique status of children under the law, the States have a 
‘significant’ interest in certain abortion regulations aimed at 
protecting children ‘that is not present in the case of an adult.’”114 
This “significant” interest sustained the parental consent 
limitations at issue in Casey even though the limitations applied 
from the outset of pregnancy.115  
Following Casey, the Court has continued to consider pre-
Casey precedent with respect to parental consent provisions, 
notwithstanding the Court’s adoption of the undue burden 
standard.116 These prior cases were decided under strict scrutiny, 
a standard of review that always gives the state an opportunity to 
explain itself,117 suggesting that a state is permitted to justify 
itself under Casey’s undue burden test. 
Gonzales also indicates that additional state interests are 
relevant to the undue burden test. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg in 
her dissent in Gonzales accused the majority of taking into 
account other interests when it upheld the federal partial-birth 
abortion ban.118 The majority purports to ground its decision in 
                                                                                                     
 114. Id. at 427 n.10 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 
428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976)); see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990) 
(“The State has a strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of its young 
citizens . . . .”); Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 490–91  (“A State’s interest in protecting 
immature minors will sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either 
parental of judicial.”). 
 115. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 899 (concluding that Pennsylvania’s parental 
consent provisions were constitutional); Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 493 (determining 
that Missouri’s parental consent requirement was constitutional). 
 116. See Planned Parenthood of Idaho v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 922 n.12 
(2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court chastised (and reversed) this court for failing to 
apply Bellotti II and Akron II faithfully.” (citing Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 
292, 295–97 (1997))); Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1222 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(“Casey jettisoned . . . the strict scrutiny standard applied in Roe.”). 
 117. See Wasden, 376 F.3d at 922 n.12 (noting that the pre-Casey cases 
addressing parental consent statutes applied strict scrutiny, and not the undue 
burden standard); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 
(1992) (noting the cases involving Roe “decided that any regulation touching 
upon the abortion decision must survive strict scrutiny, to be sustained only if 
drawn in narrow terms to further a compelling state interest.”). 
 118. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 182 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“Ultimately, the Court admits that ‘moral concerns’ are at work, concerns that 
could yield prohibitions on any abortion. Notably, the concerns expressed are 
untethered to any ground genuinely serving the Government’s interest in 
ROE, CASEY, AND SEX-SELECTION ABORTION BANS 1117 
the state’s interests in protecting potential life and regulating the 
medical profession,119 but it is evident that other interests were at 
work, for the Court states: “There can be no doubt the 
government has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics 
of the medical profession.”120 Likewise, by noting an important 
purpose of the federal partial-birth abortion ban, the Court 
indicated the relevance of the state’s interest in protecting life 
outside the womb: “Implicitly approving such a brutal and 
inhumane procedure by choosing not to prohibit it will further 
coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all 
vulnerable and innocent human life, making it increasingly 
difficult to protect such life.”121 
Finally, if the undue burden test does not allow for 
consideration of additional state interests, then a woman 
effectively has an absolute right to have an abortion pre-viability, 
a consequence that is anathema to the principle that no 
fundamental right is absolute and the state always has the 
opportunity to justify itself.122 Consistent with this idea, Casey 
indicates that the woman’s right is “to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion,”123 and that “[n]ot all government 
                                                                                                     
preserving life.”). 
 119. See id. at 157 (noting that “the State has a significant role to play in 
regulating the medical profession” and that “[t]he government may use its voice 
and its regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the life within the 
woman”). 
 120. Id. Interestingly, this interest may have been identified in Roe, but it 
disappeared when the Court established viability as the line at which the state’s 
power to restrict abortion increases. 
 121. Id. (quoting the congressional findings in support of the Act).  
 122. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3056 (2010) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (“No fundamental right—not even the First Amendment—is 
absolute.”); id. at 3101 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he strength of the 
individual’s liberty interests and the State’s regulatory interests must always be 
assessed and compared. No right is absolute.”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873–75 (1992) (noting that the Court in Roe “was not 
recognizing an absolute right” “[a]s our jurisprudence relating to all liberties 
save perhaps abortion have recognized, not every law which makes a right more 
difficult to exercise is, ipso facto, an infringement of that right”); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973) (“The Court’s decisions recognizing a right of 
privacy also acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that 
right is appropriate.”); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85 (1949) (“[E]ven the 
fundamental rights of the Bill of Rights are not absolute.”). 
 123. Casey, 505 U.S. at 875 (emphasis added) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)). 
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intrusion is of necessity unwarranted.”124 As the Court observes, 
“Roe did not declare an unqualified constitutional right to an 
abortion . . . . Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly 
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to 
terminate her pregnancy.”125 Indeed, the very name of Casey’s 
test—the “undue” burden test—suggests that the state has the 
opportunity to explain why its restrictions are “due” or 
“warranted.” 
c. A State’s Compelling Interest in Eliminating Sex 
Discrimination May Allow a Sex-Selection Abortion Ban to 
Survive the Undue Burden Test 
Though there are a number of reasons for concluding that 
additional state interests are relevant to the undue burden test, 
the Court’s summary dismissal of the challenge to the parental 
consent requirement in Casey126 leaves one to wonder how the 
additional interests supporting a narrow sex-selection abortion 
would be weighed under the test. The answer may come from an 
unlikely place—the Court’s opinions with respect to the 
constitutionally protected freedom to associate for expressive 
purposes and, specifically, the opinions in Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees,127 Board of Directors of Rotary International v. 
Rotary Club of Duarte,128 and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.129 In 
those cases, the Court considered whether public accommodation 
statutes—those that prohibit discrimination based on, among 
other attributes, race, religion, sex, and, in the case of the statute 
as issue in Dale, sexual orientation—unconstitutionally infringed 
on a group’s associational rights.130 The Court in all of the cases 
                                                                                                     
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 874–75 (emphasis added) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 
473–74 (1977)). 
 126. See id. at 899 (disposing of the challenge to the parental consent 
provisions in two paragraphs and with almost no analysis). 
 127. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 128. 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 
 129. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 130. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 644, 645–47 (explaining that the plaintiff filed 
suit, alleging the Boy Scouts violated New Jersey’s public accommodation 
statute by revoking his membership because he was homosexual and that the 
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abandoned strict scrutiny in favor of an undue burden-like 
balancing test131 and, in two, determined that the state’s interest 
in eliminating sex discrimination tipped the balance in favor of 
the statute.132  
In Roberts, the Court determined that a Minnesota public 
accommodation statute did not violate the constitutional rights of 
the United States Jaycees by requiring the group to admit women 
as full voting members.133 Just as it had in Roe with respect to a 
woman’s constitutional right to choose abortion, the Court in 
Roberts indicated that “[t]he right to associate for expressive 
purposes is not . . . absolute.”134 Accordingly, the Court stated, 
“[i]nfringements on that right may be justified by regulations 
                                                                                                     
Court granted certiorari to decide whether the law violated the First 
Amendment); Duarte, 481 U.S. at 539 (stating the question to be decided was 
“whether a California [public accommodation] statute that requires California 
Rotary Clubs to admit women members violates the First Amendment”); 
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612, 615 (introducing the plaintiff’s argument that the 
public accommodation statute infringed on male Jaycees members’ rights of free 
speech and expressive association). 
 131. See Dale, 539 U.S. at 640–41 (describing the balancing test needed to 
weigh the potential burden on the Boy Scouts’ freedom of expressive association 
against the state’s interest in combating discrimination against a segment of 
society); Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549 (stating the law does not infringe on Rotary 
members’ expressive freedoms and that any infringement would be justified 
because it serves a compelling state interest); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626 (finding 
that the plaintiffs had “failed to demonstrate that the Act impose[d] any serious 
burdens” on their associational rights). 
 132. See Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549 
In Roberts we recognized that the State’s compelling interest in 
assuring equal access to women extends to the acquisition of 
leadership skills and business contacts as well as tangible goods and 
services. Id., at 626, 104 S.Ct., at 3254. The Unruh Act plainly serves 
this interest. We therefore hold that application of the Unruh Act to 
California Rotary Clubs does not violate the right of expressive 
association afforded by the First Amendment. 
(citations omitted); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628 (“[Absent] a showing far more 
substantial than that attempted by the Jaycees, we decline to indulge in the 
sexual stereotyping that underlies appellee’s contention that, by allowing 
women to vote, application of the Minnesota Act will change the content or 
impact of the organization’s speech.”). 
 133. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612, 627 (1984) (holding that 
there is “no basis . . . for concluding that admission of women as full voting 
members will impede the organization’s ability to engage in . . . protected 
activities or to disseminate its preferred views” because the Act requires no 
change in stating or promoting the group’s beliefs).  
 134. Id. at 623. 
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adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the 
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means 
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”135  
Upholding the Minnesota statute, the Court in Roberts 
observed that a state has a compelling interest “of the highest 
order” in “eradicating” discrimination against women, 136 that the 
statute was not designed to suppress speech, but aimed at 
“eliminating discrimination and assuring citizens equal access to 
publicly available goods and services,”137 and that the statute did 
not impose “any serious burdens on the male members’ freedom 
of expressive association.”138 As to the relative burden, the Court 
noted that the Jaycees already allowed women to participate as 
nonvoting members and that admitting women as full members 
did not affect policy positions the Jaycees had taken over the 
years.139 According to the Court, the statute “impose[d] no 
restrictions on the organization’s ability to exclude individuals 
with ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing 
members, [and] even if enforcement of the Act cause[d] some 
incidental abridgment of the Jaycees’ protected speech, that effect 
is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the State’s 
legitimate purposes.”140 
The Court in Duarte reached a similar conclusion with 
respect to a California public accommodation statute’s burden on 
the associational rights of Rotary International, whose 
constitution limited Rotary Club membership to men.141 In 
finding in favor of the state, the Court in Duarte considered most 
of the same factors that it had in Roberts.142 As to the extent of 
the burden on their freedom of expressive association, the Court 
                                                                                                     
 135. Id. at 623–24. 
 136. Id. at 623.  
 137. Id. at 623–24. 
 138. Id. at 626. 
 139. Id. at 626–27. 
 140. Id. at 627–28. 
 141. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 
549 (1987) (analogizing the holding in this case to the holding in Roberts). 
 142. Compare Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627–29 (1984) 
(considering the state’s purpose, the means chosen, the necessity of the means to 
achieve the purpose, and the burden on the organization), with Duarte, 481 U.S. 
at 548–49 (considering the state’s interest in eliminating discrimination against 
women and incidental or other burdens on the club). 
ROE, CASEY, AND SEX-SELECTION ABORTION BANS 1121 
noted that Rotary Clubs had a practice of not engaging in “public 
questions” and that the California statute did not preclude or 
limit the ability of the clubs to pursue “their basic goals of 
humanitarian service, high ethical standards in all vocations, 
good will, and peace.”143 In addition, just as it had in Roberts, the 
Court indicated that, “[e]ven if the [California statute did] work 
some slight infringement on Rotary members’ right of expressive 
association, that infringement [was] justified because it serves 
the State’s compelling interest in eliminating discrimination 
against women.”144 Unlike in Roberts, however, the Court in 
Duarte did not evaluate whether the effect of the “slight 
infringement” was greater than necessary to serve the state’s 
purposes in eradicating sex discrimination. Instead, the Court in 
Duarte seemed to find that a public accommodation statute 
prohibiting sex discrimination, by its very nature, imposes no 
infringement that is greater than is necessary. Said another way, 
if a public accommodation statute’s infringement on a party’s 
expressive associational rights is only slight, the state’s interest 
in eradicating sex discrimination always tips the balance in favor 
of the statute. 
The issue in Dale was whether a New Jersey public 
accommodation statute that prohibited discrimination based on 
sexual orientation unconstitutionally infringed upon the freedom 
of expressive association enjoyed by the Boy Scouts of America, 
which had revoked the adult membership of homosexual activist 
James Dale.145 Finding in favor of the Boy Scouts,146 the Court 
noted the balancing test it had applied in Roberts and Duarte: 
[A]fter finding a compelling state interest, the Court [in 
Roberts and Duarte] went on to examine whether or not the 
application of the state law would impose any “serious burden” 
on the organization’s rights of expressive association. So in 
these cases, the associational interest in freedom of expression 
has been set on one side of the scale, and the State’s interest 
on the other.147 
                                                                                                     
 143. Duarte, 481 U.S. at 548. 
 144. Roberts, 481 U.S. at 549. 
 145. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644–45 (2000). 
 146. See id. at 644 (holding New Jersey’s public accommodation law violated 
the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right to expressive association). 
 147. Id. at 658–59. 
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The Court in Dale then purported to apply the balancing test, 
though it did so without explaining why the scale tipped in favor 
of the Boy Scouts. Largely deferring to the assessment made by 
the Boy Scouts as to the burden involved, the Court merely 
concluded that requiring the Boy Scouts to include Dale imposed 
a significant burden on the organization’s freedom of association 
for expressive purposes and that “[t]he state interests embodied 
in New Jersey’s public accommodation law [did] not justify such a 
severe intrusion.”148 
The most cautious reading of Dale, and perhaps the best, is 
that an infringement on a group’s freedom of association for 
expressive purposes only is constitutional if the infringement is 
slight and advances a compelling government interest. According 
to the Court, 
We recognized in cases such as Roberts and Duarte that States 
have a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination 
against women in public accommodations. But in each of these 
cases we went on to conclude that the enforcement of these 
statutes would not materially interfere with the ideas that the 
organization sought to express.149 
Moreover, the Court in Dale indicated that its analysis was 
similar to that in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and 
Bisexual Group of Boston,150 a case in which the Court had 
applied its “traditional First Amendment analysis”151 and found 
that a public accommodation law preventing discrimination based 
on sexual orientation violated the First Amendment free speech 
rights of private parade organizers who did not wish to have a 
homosexual group march in their parade.152 In reaching this 
decision, the Court observed that no legitimate interest had been 
identified to support the statute, but that, if the state was trying 
to “produce a society free of . . . biases,” applying the statute to 
                                                                                                     
 148. Id. at 653, 659. 
 149. Id. at 657. 
 150. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 151. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 566; see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 
640, 659 (2000) (stating its First Amendment analysis was similar to that in 
Hurley). 
 152. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561, 566 (1995) (holding the law requiring 
parade organizers to admit groups expressing messaging inconsistent with the 
organizers’ views to be an unconstitutional violation of free speech). 
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the parade organizers would strike at the very heart of their free 
speech rights because “[o]ur tradition of free speech commands 
that a speaker who takes to the street corner to express his views 
in this way should be free from interference by the State based on 
the content of what he says.”153 In other words, if the object of the 
public accommodation statute in Hurley was to control the 
content of a person’s speech, its impact would be severe and 
impermissible. Similarly, the Court in Dale found that the New 
Jersey law “directly and immediately affect[ed] associational 
rights . . . that enjoy First Amendment protection.”154 The 
severity of the impact, therefore, seems to have been critical to 
the Court’s decision in Dale, leaving one to conclude that Roberts, 
Duarte, and Dale only permit infringement on expressive 
associational rights when the infringement is slight and the state 
has a compelling interest “unrelated to the suppression of 
ideas.”155  
The nature of a woman’s right to choose abortion and the 
nature of the right to freedom of expressive association are 
surprisingly similar. Roe recognized that, because of the presence 
of a potential life, the right to privacy associated with a woman’s 
right to choose is “inherently different [from the right to privacy 
as it relates to] marital intimacy, or bedroom possession of 
obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education.”156 
Likewise, the Court in Duarte and Roberts recognized that the 
relationships among the members of the Jaycees and Rotary 
Clubs were unlike the intimate relationships involved in 
marriage, procreation, and family relationships, which warranted 
more robust associational protection.157 Thus, one might 
reasonably argue that, just as a state’s compelling interest in 
eradicating sex discrimination justifies a slight infringement on 
expressive associational rights, the same compelling interest—
                                                                                                     
 153. Id. at 578–79. 
 154. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659. 
 155. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). 
 156. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). 
 157. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 
545–47 (1987) (distinguishing the relationship among Rotary Club members 
from the relationships that have enjoyed greater associational protection); 
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620–21 (distinguishing the relationships involved in the 
Jaycees from more “intimate relationships”). 
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one “of the highest order”158—justifies a sex-selection abortion 
ban that imposes only a slight infringement on a woman’s right to 
choose. 
Moreover, interests like those present in Gonzales, a case in 
which the Court employed the undue burden standard,159 apply 
equally to sex-selection abortion bans. In Gonzales, the Court 
noted that, in adopting the federal partial-birth abortion ban, 
Congress was concerned that allowing partial-birth abortion 
would “coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but 
all vulnerable and innocent human life, making it increasingly 
difficult to protect such life.”160 Permitting sex-selection abortion 
similarly could “coarsen society” to the equal dignity of women 
and men and could impede the progress society has made in that 
regard.161 As the American Society of Reproductive Medicine 
(ASRM) asserted in discussing pre-implantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD), if individual or family desires with respect to the sex of 
offspring are: 
fulfilled on a large scale through PGD for sex selection, they 
may contribute to a society’s gender stereotyping and overall 
gender discrimination. On the other hand, if they are 
expressed and fulfilled only on a small scale and sporadically 
(as is presently the case), their social implications will be 
correspondingly limited. Still, they remain vulnerable to the 
judgment that no matter what their basis, they identify gender 
as a reason to value one person over another, and they support 
socially constructed stereotypes of what gender means. In 
doing so, they not only reinforce possibilities of unfair 
discrimination, but they may trivialize human reproduction by 
                                                                                                     
 158. Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549 (quoting Roberts); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. 
 159. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2008) (upholding the 
challenged law because it did not impose an undue burden). 
 160. See id. at 157 (quoting congressional findings on the effects of allowing 
partial-birth abortions). 
 161. Legislative findings included in several bills proposing sex-selection 
bans indicate that the bans are justified as a measure to protect against 
“coarsening society.” Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2013, H.R. 
447, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(3)(B) (2013); H.B. 13-1131, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. 
Sess. § 1 (Colo. 2013); S.B. 13-056, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 1 (Colo. 
2013); H.B. 845, 2013 Leg., Leg. Sess. 2013 (Fla. 2013); S.B. 1072, 2013 Leg., 
Leg. Sess. 2013 (Fla. 2013); A. 2157, 215th Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. § 1(p) (N.J. 2013). 
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making it depend on the selection of nonessential features of 
offspring.162 
In addition, the Court noted in Gonzales that it “has in the past 
confirmed the validity of drawing boundaries to prevent certain 
practices that extinguish life and are close to actions that are 
condemned.”163 Because sex-selection abortion bears a striking 
similarity to the historical practice of female infanticide in 
societies that have valued boys over girls,164 banning the 
procedure sets a necessary and appropriate boundary. 
A state that adopts a sex-selection abortion ban also has a 
strong argument that it is “protecting the integrity and ethics of 
the medical profession,”165 an interest the Court in Gonzales 
found important. In upholding the federal partial-birth abortion 
ban, the Court observed that “Congress was concerned . . . with 
the effects on the medical community and on its reputation 
caused by the practice of partial-birth abortion.”166 The same 
ethical issues exist with respect to sex-selection abortion. In fact, 
the case for a narrow sex-selection abortion ban might be more 
compelling than that for the federal partial birth abortion ban 
because the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(ACOG), which vehemently opposed the partial-birth abortion 
ban,167 generally considers performing an abortion based on the 
sex of the fetus to be unethical: 
                                                                                                     
 162. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Sex Selection and Preimplantation Genetic 
Diagnosis, 72 FERTILITY & STERILITY 595, 597 (1999), http://www.asrm.org/ 
uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/Ethics_Committee_Repo
rts_and_Statements/Sex_Selection.pdf. 
 163. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2008). 
 164. See E.G. Austin, Looking Out for Baby Girls, ECONOMIST (June 28, 
2011, 4:42 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/ 
06/sex-selective-abortion (last visited Feb. 6, 2014) (noting that “widespread 
access to abortion . . . is not the only cause of . . . gendercide—many baby girls 
are simply killed”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jason C. 
Greaves, Sex-Selective Abortion in the U.S.: Does Roe v. Wade Protect Arbitrary 
Gender Discrimination?, 24 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 333, 335 (2013) 
(“Before the widespread availability of prenatal screening, [son preference] was 
accomplished through infanticide . . . .”). 
 165. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
702 (1997)). 
 166. Id. 
 167. See ACOG Statement on the U.S. Supreme Court Decision Upholding 
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS & 
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The committee accepts, as ethically permissible, the practice of 
sex selection to prevent sex-linked genetic disorders. The 
committee opposes meeting other requests for sex selection, 
such as the belief that offspring of a certain sex are inherently 
more valuable. The committee opposes meeting requests for 
sex selection for personal and family reasons, including family 
balancing, because of the concern that such requests may 
ultimately support sexist practices.168 
In addition, though not favoring legal prohibition of sex-selection 
through PGD, ASRM states that “the cumulative weight of the 
arguments against nonmedically motivated sex-selection gives 
cause for serious ethical caution.”169 
Moreover, a sex-selection abortion ban arguably advances a 
state’s interest in the safety and well-being of its citizens. Bills 
both in Congress and in the Colorado and New Jersey 
legislatures assert that  
[s]ex selection abortion results in an unnatural sex ratio 
imbalance, which is undesirable due to the inability of the 
numerically predominant sex to find mates; and such 
imbalance gives rise to the commoditization of humans, in the 
form of human trafficking and a consequent increase in 
kidnapping and other violent crimes.170 
These claims are not unfounded. Mara Hvistendahl postulates in 
a 2011 book that similar effects have occurred in China because 
of a skewed sex-ratio that resulted from the abortion of female 
fetuses just because they are female.171 These effects have not 
                                                                                                     
GYNECOLOGISTS (Apr. 18, 2007), http://www.acog.org/About_ACOG/ 
News_Room/News_Releases/2007/ACOG_Statement_on_the_US_Supreme_Cour
t_Decision (last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (quoting the ACOG president as saying 
“[t]oday’s decision to uphold the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 is 
shameful and incomprehensible to those of us who have dedicated our lives to 
caring for women”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 168. Sex Selection, COMM. OPINION NO. 360 (Comm. on Ethics), Feb. 2007, 
reaffirmed 2011, at 4, http://www.acog.org/~/media/Committee%20Opinions/ 
Committee%20on%20Ethics/co360.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20140207T1106472847. 
 169. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 162, at 598. 
 170. H.R. 447, 113th Cong. § 2N (2013); see also H.B. 13-1131, 69th Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 2(a)(XII) (Colo. 2013); A. 2157, 215th Leg., 2d Ann. 
Sess. (N.J. 2013). 
 171. See MARA HVISTENDAHL, UNNATURAL SELECTION: CHOOSING BOYS OVER 
GIRLS, AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF A WORLD FULL OF MEN 217–25 (2011) 
(describing the consequences of an imbalanced sex ratio); Jonathan V. Last, The 
War Against Girls, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/ 
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been seen in the United States on a large scale, but there is 
reason to be concerned about them. Researchers have found that, 
in particular communities, after having a girl, the sex ratio for 
some children becomes unnaturally high.172 As more and more 
Americans try to design the “perfect family,”173 the risks 
associated with sex selection could become more real. 
Despite the state’s compelling interest in eliminating sex 
discrimination and the other substantial interests that support 
sex-selection abortion bans, if Casey’s undue burden test applies 
in the same way as the Court seems to have applied the 
balancing test in its freedom of expressive association cases, a 
sex-selection abortion ban will survive only if it infringes on a 
woman’s right to choose no more than slightly.174 Reaching such a 
                                                                                                     
article/SB10001424052702303657404576361691165631366.html (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2014) (reviewing Hvistendahl’s book) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 172. See Sujatha Jesudason & Anat Shenker-Osorio, Sex Selection in 
America: Why It Persists and How We Can Change It, ATLANTIC (May 21, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/05/sex-selection-in-america-
why-it-persists-and-how-we-can-change-it/257864/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) 
(noting that a normal sex ratio is between 1.02 and 1.06 boys per girl and that, 
in “Korean, Chinese, and Indian communities . . . after having one girl, parents 
have as many as 1.17 boys per girl,” and after having two girls, “the ratio goes 
up to 1.51”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 173.  See id. (noting that fertility clinics advertise services to facilitate 
“family balancing”). A number of companies now provide services to facilitate 
sex selection. See, e.g., GENDER SELECT, LLC, http://chooseagender.com/ 
Default.aspx?gclid=CKTevcqMjrYCFcWPPAodQVIAnw (last visited Mar. 16, 
2014) (offering its services to help people “bring[] the number of children of each 
gender in one family closer to equal”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). These companies may not provide sex-selection abortion services, but 
their existence indicates a demand for sex selection. It is not hard to imagine a 
case in which a couple chooses a sex-selection abortion after their preconception 
efforts fail. 
 174. The Dale opinion, however, could be interpreted as allowing a greater 
infringement. In Dale, the Court did not describe the state interests supporting 
the New Jersey publication accommodation statute at issue in the case or assess 
the weight of those interests, but only decided that the interests were 
insufficient to justify a substantial infringement on the associational rights of 
the Boy Scouts. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 540 U.S. 640, 659 (2000). Early in its 
opinion, the Court noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court had found that the 
state’s “compelling interest in eliminating the destructive consequences of 
discrimination from society” justified the New Jersey public accommodation law, 
but the Dale opinion nowhere identifies this broad interest as compelling. Id. at 
640. Moreover, the Dale Court indicated that its analysis was similar to that in 
Hurley, and in Hurley, the Court noted that no legitimate interest had been 
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conclusion is difficult at best because an abortion ban of any type 
would appear to strike at the very heart of the abortion right. 
Yet, a close look at the foundations of a woman’s right to choose 
abortion reveals its essence, which a narrow sex-selection 
abortion ban does not “directly” or “immediately”175 affect.  
When it recognized a woman’s right to abort a nonviable 
fetus, the Court in Roe was driven by a number of detriments 
associated with pregnancy and parenthood: 
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant 
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific 
and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early 
pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, 
may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. 
Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical 
health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, 
for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and 
there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already 
unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other 
cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing 
stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.176 
The Court in Casey drew on Roe’s concerns when it described a 
concept of liberty that includes a woman’s right to choose.177 
According to Casey, the Court’s previous decisions regarding 
contraception 
support the reasoning in Roe relating to the woman’s liberty 
because they involve personal decisions concerning not only 
the meaning of procreation, but also human responsibility and 
respect for it. . . . One view is based on such reverence for the 
                                                                                                     
identified to support the infringement of the speech rights of parade organizers 
imposed by a Massachusetts public accommodation law that barred 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Id. at 659; Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, 
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 578 (1995). One might argue 
then that the Court in Dale found no compelling interest in preventing 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and therefore left open the 
possibility that a significant infringement (though perhaps not one that is 
severe) might be constitutional when justified by a compelling interest.  
 175. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659. 
 176. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 177. Justin Gillette, Comment, Pregnant and Prejudiced: The 
Constitutionality of Sex- and Race-Selective Abortion Restrictions, 88 WASH. L. 
REV. 645, 664 (2013) (noting that, since Roe, the Court often has referred to 
“women’s reproductive rights in terms of liberty interests rather than the right 
to privacy”). 
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wonder of creation that any pregnancy ought to be welcomed 
and carried to full term no matter how difficult it will be to 
provide for the child and ensure its well-being. Another is that 
the inability to provide for the nurture and care of the infant is 
a cruelty to the child and an anguish to the parent. . . . [These] 
concerns are present when the woman confronts the reality 
that, perhaps despite her attempts to avoid it, she has become 
pregnant. It was this dimension of personal liberty that Roe 
sought to protect.178 
The detriments described in Roe and the confines of the liberty 
interest explained in Casey arguably form the core of a woman’s 
right to choose. 179 
A narrow ban on sex-selection abortion does not implicate 
any of these concerns in a meaningful way. A woman who chooses 
to have an abortion based solely on the sex of the fetus is not 
concerned with her health, the burdens of maternity, additional 
offspring or child care, the distress in having a child, the inability 
to care for a child, or the stigma of unwed motherhood. Nor can 
one genuinely claim that a narrow sex-selection abortion ban 
inhibits a woman’s liberty “to define [her] own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life.”180 The sex of a child alone has little, if any, bearing 
on any of these things. Therefore, any infringement that a narrow 
sex-selection ban might impose on a woman’s right to choose 
reasonably can be characterized as slight or insubstantial and, in 
light of the state’s compelling interest in eliminating sex 
discrimination and the other important interests described above, 
justified. 
                                                                                                     
 178. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992). 
 179. Gillette, supra note 177, at 666 (“The Roe Court reasoned that the 
fundamental nature of [the abortion] right stemmed in part from the drastic 
consequences that may flow from the inability to exercise the right: forcing a 
woman to keep an unwanted pregnancy can take a serious toll on . . . her 
physical and psychological health.”). 
 180. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
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V. The Future of Sex-Selection Abortion Bans 
As should now be clear, the case for the constitutionality pre-
viability of the most narrow sex-selection abortion ban is a 
difficult one. Not surprisingly, broader bans are harder to justify.  
Even post-viability, a broader ban may run afoul of Casey. As 
discussed above, bans that prohibit an abortion sought solely 
based on the sex of the fetus do not need life or health exceptions 
because an abortion that is necessary to protect the life or health 
of the woman is not based solely on the sex of the fetus.181 A 
broader ban that proscribes abortions when sought based on (but 
not solely based on) the sex of the fetus, on the other hand, raises 
questions about how a woman who has other reasons for choosing 
abortion might be affected. If the sex of the fetus is one among 
other reasons, does the ban apply? If so, it almost certainly is 
unconstitutional post-viability—because it does not allow for 
abortion when a woman’s life or health is at risk—and pre-
viability—because it would preclude a woman from choosing an 
abortion when she has any other permissible reason.  
Of course, bans that merely fail to use the word “solely” are 
susceptible to a narrow interpretation. North Carolina’s broadly 
written ban, however, is not. It clearly captures cases in which 
sex selection is one among other reasons and contains neither a 
life nor a health exception.182 As a result, North Carolina’s ban 
very likely is unconstitutional both pre- and post-viability. 183 
                                                                                                     
 181. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (considering the 
constitutionality post-viability of narrow sex-selection abortion bans). 
 182. S.B. 353, Gen. Assemb., 2013-14 Reg. Sess. § 3(a) (N.C. 2013) (emphasis 
added). 
 183. See S.B. 353, Gen. Assemb., 2013-14 Reg. Sess. § 3(a) (N.C. 2013) 
(banning abortion when “a significant factor . . . is related to the sex of the 
[fetus].” (emphasis added)). In fact, the language used in North Carolina’s ban is 
reminiscent of language that proved problematic in the Supreme Court’s 
consideration in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), of Nebraska’s partial 
birth abortion ban. In Stenberg, the Court determined that the statute posed an 
undue burden because it could be interpreted to encompass a [dilation and 
extraction procedure (“D&E”)], which is commonly used. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. 
at 939, 945–46 (describing the overbreadth of Nebraska’s partial-birth abortion 
ban and finding an undue burden). The statute that the Court found 
problematic “forb[ade] ‘deliberately and intentionally delivering into the vagina 
a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of 
performing a procedure that the person performing such procedure knows will 
kill the unborn child.’” Id. at 938 (emphasis added). The Court in Gonzales, in 
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The sex-selection abortion bans that have been enacted or 
proposed tend to have a uniform scope throughout pregnancy and 
therefore fail to account for the different standards that apply to 
pre-viability and post-viability measures under Casey.184 As a 
result, the narrowest bans sacrifice strength post-viability in 
favor of maximizing the likelihood of surviving constitutional 
scrutiny pre-viability. Broader bans, in contrast, find themselves 
on very shaky ground pre-viability, but attempt to take better 
advantage of the more robust power states have with respect to 
post-viability measures.  
States could achieve better balance by drafting their statutes 
to reflect more closely the differing standards that apply pre- and 
post-viability under Casey. Pre-viability, a state should do no 
more than prohibit abortions sought solely for sex-selection. As 
indicated above, even such a narrow sex-selection abortion ban 
faces significant challenges pre-viability, and leaving any 
ambiguity as to a ban’s breadth only increases the chances of its 
being found unconstitutional.185 Post-viability, a state might use 
language similar to that in the North Carolina ban—prohibiting a 
person from performing an abortion when he or she has 
“knowledge, or an objective reason to know, that a significant 
factor in the woman seeking the abortion is related to the sex of 
the [fetus]”186—but with specific life and health exceptions. In 
addition, a state should be sure to include specific severability 
provisions so that a ban can survive post-viability even if struck 
down pre-viability.187 By taking these simple steps, a state can 
                                                                                                     
upholding the federal partial-birth abortion ban, found the omission of the 
language covering delivery of a “substantial portion” of an unborn child to be 
significant. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 152 (“The Act . . . thus 
displaces the interpretation of ‘delivering’ dictated by the Nebraska statute’s 
reference to a ‘substantial portion’ of the fetus.”). 
 184. See supra notes 16–24 and accompanying text (discussing proposed and 
passed legislation). 
 185. See supra notes 54–55 (discussing the uphill battle a pre-viability ban 
faces). 
 186. S.B. 353, Gen. Assemb., 2013–14 Reg. Sess. § 3(a) (N.C. 2013). 
 187. Only the Illinois law and the bills proposed in Indiana, Missouri, and 
Virginia include severability clauses. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 510/6(8) (1985); 
H.B. 1430, 118th Gen. Assemb., 2013 Leg. Sess. § 4(a)–(b) (Ind. 2013); S.B. 183, 
118th Gen. Assemb., 2013 Leg. Sess. § 4(c) (Ind. 2013); H.B. 386, 97th Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 188.281(2) (Mo. 2013); H.B. 1316, Gen. Assemb., 2013 
Sess. § 18.2-71.2(D) (Va. 2012). 
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maximize the effect of a ban, while improving its chances of 
withstanding a constitutional challenge.  
Regardless of whether a sex-selection abortion ban applies or 
is constitutional pre-viability, states should strengthen their bans 
by requiring that a woman be given a disclosure regarding the 
ban before she has an abortion. In Casey, the Court indicated that 
“a State [may] further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of 
the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision 
that is mature and informed, even when in so doing the State 
expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion,”188 and that a 
state law requiring a woman to be given information that is 
“truthful and not misleading” does not impose an undue 
burden.189 Consequently, a state might seek to curb sex-selection 
abortion by requiring a disclosure such as the following: 
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
considers performing an abortion based on the sex of the fetus 
to be unethical, except when aimed at preventing sex-linked 
genetic disorders. The State of __________ likewise considers 
choosing to have an abortion based [solely] on the sex of the 
unborn child to be unethical, and performing a sex-selection 
abortion [after an unborn child has reached the point at which 
he or she can live outside the womb] is prohibited by 
_____________ law.190 
A state speaks strongly when it adopts a sex-selection abortion 
ban, but it needs to make sure that its message is heard. Only the 
legislation proposed in Virginia requires disclosure of the ban to a 
woman seeking to have an abortion.191 Other states would benefit 
from doing the same. 
                                                                                                     
 188. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992). 
 189. Id. at 882. 
 190. A state might even be able to require a physician to make this 
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Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Casey and a Woman’s Right to Know: 
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Finally, states would do well to include sex-selection abortion 
bans within broader legislation aimed at eliminating sex 
discrimination against potential life. One report indicates that, 
“as of 2006, half of American fertility clinics that offer embryo 
screening allow would-be parents some form or sex-selective add-
ons . . . and the market is growing.”192 Legislators who are 
concerned about potential life inside the womb should be equally 
concerned with practices such as these that affect potential life 
outside the womb, and by adopting bans on sex selection that 
extend beyond sex-selection abortions, legislators can avoid a 
charge that they are singling out abortion and acquiescing to an 
activity that has the similar effect. 
VI. Conclusion 
In light of all of the potential pitfalls associated with sex-
selection abortion bans, one reasonably might ask whether the 
bans are worthwhile. After all, any abortion restriction that a 
state adopts must allow the procedure when it is necessary to 
preserve a woman’s health,193 and as Clarke Forsythe points out 
in a recent book, the broad definition the Court in Doe v. Bolton194 
gave to the “‘health’ exception . . . swallowed the supposed ability 
of the states to prohibit abortion.”195 Moreover, a woman seeking 
an abortion based on the sex of the fetus need not tell anyone of 
her reason. Justice Ginsberg might say then, as she did in 
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Gonzales, that a sex-selection abortion ban “saves not a single 
fetus from destruction.”196 
Yet, sex-selection abortion bans matter. The very act of 
banning sex-selection abortions may discourage a woman from 
seeking such an abortion,197 and by enacting a ban, a state 
expresses its view about potential life and the equal dignity of 
women and men. As suggested by Roberts and Duarte, a state has 
a compelling interest in delivering this message,198 and a state 
speaks with particular strength when it adopts a ban. A sex-
selection abortion ban that applies after a fetus becomes viable 
can deliver this message and certainly is more easily defensible 
under Casey, but only a ban that applies throughout pregnancy 
can affirm that women and men always share equal dignity. 
Nevertheless, as this Article demonstrates, it is difficult to 
argue that a pre-viability ban of any type is constitutional under 
Casey. With that in mind, states need to be realistic about what 
they can achieve through their sex-selection abortion bans and 
must be smart about how they draft them. Wise lawmakers will 
adopt bans that, pre-viability, are as narrow as those enacted in 
Kansas, Illinois, North Dakota, and Oklahoma and, post-viability, 
are as broad as the ban adopted in North Carolina, but with life 
and health exceptions. If states do otherwise, their efforts may be 
for naught and their simple but important message could be lost. 
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